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Against pronouncements of the recent demise of both democracy and the 
political, I maintain that there is, rather, something amiss in our societies with 
the process of politicization in which social grievances are translated into 
matters of political concern and become object of policy making. I therefore 
propose to seek an antidote to the depoliticizing tendencies of our age by 
reanimating the mechanism transmitting social conflicts and grievances into 
politics. To that purpose, I formulate WKHQRWLRQRIDµfundamental right to 
SROLWLFV¶ as the opposite of the techne of policy-making.  I articulate this right 
via a reconstruction of the logical presuppositions of democracy as collective 
self-authorship.  I then recast the concept of non-domination by discerning 
two trajectories of domination ± µUHODWLRQDO¶DQGµV\VWHPLF¶RQHV, to argue that 
in a viable democracy that takes full use of the right to politics, dynamics of 
politicization should take place along both trajectories; currently, however, 
matters of systemic injustice get translated in relational terms and politicized 
as redistributive concerns.  
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The demise of the political, the death of democracy? 
 
³:HKDYHDYRWHEXWQRWDYRLFH´ ³:HDUHQRW against the system, the 
system is against us´± The Spanish Indignados1 have been ingenious at 
coining slogans that conveyed the political exasperation of our times. The 
former outcry speaks of the injustice of political impotence; the latter ± of the 
tragedy of giving up the fight.  
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  Why has it become impossible to be heard, even as the voice of 
protest has become louder and more articulate? It has become something of 
a truism to assert that, in the clash between neoliberal globalization and 
popular democracy, democracy has fallen victim to global capitalism. Much 
before the financial meltdown inaugurated the policies of austerity and the 
stewardship of national economies was taken over by the economic experts of 
Brussels and the World Bank, it had become clear that in a globalized, 
bureaucratized, technologized world, the opportunities for ordinary citizens to 
participate in decision-making have become non-existent. As Stuart Hall put it 
over 35 years ago, when discussing the Thatcherite commitment to free 
market economics and autocratic political rule, "under this regime, the market 
is to be free; the people are to be disciplined".2 Since then, policy has taken 
the shape of the dictum There Is No Alternative (known as the abbreviation 
³TINA´) which Margaret Thatcher adopted as her hallmark, after borrowing it 
from +HUEHUW6SHQVHU¶VIRUPXODWLRQRIVRFLDO'arwinism a century earlier, as 
she turned its survival-of-the-fittest functionalist logic into kernel of policy.3  
Under TINA¶VGRPLQLXPLWLV raison d¶pFRnomie that assumes the role of 
UDLVRQG¶pWDW ± as a policy logic FRPPLWWHGWRQDWLRQDOHFRQRPLHV¶VXUYLYDO
within cut-throat international competition, regardless of the social cost of said 
survival. Thus, it seems that behind the bemoaned demise of democracy 
stands the very demise of the political.  
In a piece titled ³7KH3ROLWLFDO´ of some five years ago, Jürgen 
Habermas, joining other similar pronouncements of the death of the political, 
IRUPXODWHVWKXVWKHGLDJQRVLV³,QWKHlatter half of the 20th century politics 
was still able to wield a steering influence on the GLYHUJLQJVXEV\VWHPV«
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WRGD\DVHFRQRPLFJOREDOL]DWLRQSURJUHVVHV«µWKHSROLWLFDO¶KDVEHHQ
transformed into the code of self-mainWDLQLQJDGPLQLVWUDWLYHV\VWHP´.4  Our 
societies seem to be trapped in the limbo that systems theory sketched: 
autopoietic functional systems operate by default, keeping us equally away 
from the heaven of democratic self-rule as from the hell of an economic, moral 
and cultural crisis.  The solution Habermas advocates here, joining other 
prominent voices, is to urgently reanimate democracy.5 
Yet, democracy is hardly dead.6 Something more tragic has happened 
to it: rather than disabling it, neo-liberal managerialism has high-jacked it, 
putting it to the service of its economistic libido. In order to break free of the 
state of liPERZHQHHGWRVKDUSHQWKHGLDJQRVLVRIWKHµGHDWKRIGHPRFUDF\
WKURXJKWKHGHDWKRIWKHSROLWLFDO¶There is something amiss, I will argue, not 
with democracy, but with the process of politicization -- that is, the process 
through which social grievances get translated into matters of political concern 
and become an object of policy making. It is in the course of this process that 
democracy gets high-jacked by neoliberalism and put to its service. Thus, in 
order to save our drowning democracy, we need to discern more carefully the 
enabling conditions that energize democratic self-rule as a process in which 
widely-shared social concerns become effectively addressed policy issues. I 
therefore propose to seek an antidote to the depoliticizing tendencies of our 
age by reanimating the mechanism transmitting social conflicts and 
grievances into politics. As a step in this direction, I will formulate a 
µIXQGDPHQWDOULJKWWRSROLWLFV¶DVDQRYHUDUFKLQJFRQFHSWWKDt captures both the 
logical presuppositions of the notion of democracy and the practical conditions 
that enable it as a form of institutionalized political practice.7 
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Let me begin by zooming in on our current predicament so as to 
GLVFHUQWKHSDUWLFXODUµFLUFXPVWDQFHVWKDWHQVODYH¶XVDVMax Horkheimer 
would advise us critical theorists to proceed.8  What has been widely 
condemned as breakdown of democracy and substitution of administration for 
politics, in fact takes place as a process in which democratic deliberation, 
electoral competition and representation ± the key mechanisms of modern 
democracies ± are mobilized in giving a mandate to experts tasked with 
securing national economic survival (if not prosperity), while navigating the 
stormy waters of global economic integration.9 Significantly, in the midst of the 
financial meltdown of 2008-2010, voters in Europe massively brought back to 
power those very center-right parties whose neoliberal economic policies 
admittedly caused the financial-turned-economic-turned-social crisis. It is also 
worth noting that even when political forces opposing the neoliberal 
hegemony come to power after remarkable popular mobilization, as did the 
radical left party Syriza in Greece, they remain in service to the neoliberal 
agenda of economic viability and competitiveness. Such forces get stuck in a 
crisis management mode: the TINA policy doctrine wrecks our societies as 
rising unemployment, economic precariousness, and increased work 
pressures are the combined social costs of the global competition policy 
dictum (costs incurred on many groups in society, not only on its economically 
weakest members), but all that 7,1$¶Vpolitical rivals manage to do is engage 
in humanitarian crisis-management. This is by no means a revival of 
contestatory politics in which the very rules of the game are challenged and 
alternatives compete for public endorsement.  
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To make matters worse, the typical for neoliberalism tactics of public 
DXWKRULW\¶VRIIORDGLQJLWVVRFLDOUHVSRQVLELOLW\WRVRFLHW\DUHQRZEHLQJLQYRNHG
in the name of democracy, which remains an ultimate source of political 
legitimacy. Not only is the left failing to propose a macro alternative to the 
neoliberal abdication of social responsibility, but it is compounding the 
problem with positions that strangely echo a neoliberal discourse of anti-
statism, thus further absolving political elites and public authority of 
obligations to rule in the public interest.10 As the discourse for more 
democracy has become part of the problem, calling on democracy to save 
LWVHOIZRXOGEHDNLQWRWHOOLQJDGURZQLQJSHUVRQ³\RXKDYHWKHULJKWWROife, so 
VZLPRQ\RXFDQGRLWZHEHOLHYHLQ\RXDWWDJLUO´  
The demoting of democracy to generating popular backing for the 
expert policies of neoliberal global economic competition has brought to light 
DULJKWWKDWZHFRPHWRUHDOL]HZH¶YHKDGDWWKHYery moment when we are 
about to lose it ± ,ZLOOQDPHLWµWKHULJKWWRSolitics´DULJKWWRG\QDPLFVRI
contention and contestation among policy alternatives. ThHFRQFHSWµULJKWWR
SROLWLFV¶expresses the intuition that the people have a right that politics, rather 
than technocratic expect rule, be the process that decides their collective fate 
-- if politics is to be understood not just as a matter of power struggle among 
competing actors for occupying political office but also doing so for the sake of 
affecting the rules, and thus, the direction, of our collective existence, thereby 
enabling some societal control of the processes that shape our life. If we are 
to reclaim democracy, I shall argue, we need to begin by articulating and 
reclaiming this right to politics. Without it, other rights we hold dear become 
void of their political vitality even as they remain valid normative benchmarks.  
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However, I do not presume to craft yet another right and add it to the 
ever growing inventory of rights that are deemed indispensable to decent 
human existence. Such an ambition would require me to engage in a 
philosophical construction ± a process in which the content of rights is derived 
from a philosophically more fundamental entity ± for instance, the way human 
rights have been derived from, and grounded on, human dignity.11  I prefer to 
take an alternative path ± one that directs the investigation into the necessary 
presuppositions (logical and empirical) underlying human practices ± a path of 
rational reconstruction rather than philosophical construction.12 This will allow 
me to discern the right to politics as being already available immanently in the 
practice of democracy as self-rule. In what follows, I will present the right to 
politics as being an immanent logical presupposition that makes the right to 
democracy thinkable, coherent with an understanding of democracy as 
collective authorship of binding rules rather than as granting a popular 
mandate for expert rule.  I will place a special emphasis on the experimental 
nature of democracy, and the particular notion of agency it implies as a 
practice of collective self-rule. I will enact this immanent reconstruction of the 
right to politics within a QDUUDWLYHDERXWWKHµFRQVWLWXWLYH¶VWRU\RIGHPRFUDF\± 
a story RIWKHLQGLVSHQVDEOHHOHPHQWVWKDWFRPSRVHGHPRFUDF\¶VORJLFDO
constitution.13 In the last part of this analysis, I will re-cast the notion of 
republican non-domination (which stands in logical opposition to liberal 
DXWRQRP\E\GLVWLQJXLVKLQJEHWZHHQµUHODWLRQDO¶DQGµV\VWHPLF¶WUDMHFWRULHVRI
domination. This will allow me to clarify the particular deficiencies of 
politicization that mark our current predicament, and point out the direction in 
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which the right to politics is to be activated in order to recover those political 
dynamics that sustain democracy.    
 
The right to politics ± an immanent presupposition of the right to 
democracy  
 
a)  democratic experimentation 
0\HQWU\SRLQWLQWRVXFKDQµLPPDQHQW¶DUWLFXODWLRQRIWKHULJKWWRSROLWLFVLVthe 
focus that some of the earliest accounts of modern democracy place on the 
experimental nature of democracy as political practice. Thomas Jefferson¶V
famous pledge to democracy comes readily to mind³I have no fear that the 
result of our experiment will be that men may be trusted to govern themselves 
without a master.´14 We find the centrality of the experimental logic also in 
7RFTXHYLOOH¶V description of the young democracy in America ± an open, 
experimental society with a dynamic, though fragile, political order: ³,QWKDW
land the great experiment was to be made, by civilized man, of the attempt to 
construct society upon a new basis«WKHRULHVKLWKHUWRXQNQRZQRUGHHPHG
LPSUDFWLFDEOHZHUHWRH[KLELWDVSHFWDFOH«´15 
The agonistic self-correction that democracy incessantly performs follows 
the logic of what Kant has described as reason, fallible reason, making 
experiments with itself in a process of open-ended, self-reflexive examination 
of itself, without a pre-ordained standards and goals. Importantly, the object of 
experimentation is not external to the experimenting subject (as in the manner 
of the natural sciences).16 Similarly, dHPRFUDF\¶VXOWLPDWHSRZHULVWRSOD\ 
with its own power. Experimentation, in turn, implies availability of choices, 
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risk-taking, and welcoming the uncertainty of the outcomes of 
experimentation. It would not be fair to burden democracy with the 
H[SHFWDWLRQWKDWLWZLOODOZD\VJHWWKLQJVULJKW'HPRFUDF\¶VSHQFKDQWIRU
experimentation makes it faulty and incoherent, and we can neither object to 
this fragility nor despise it ± experimentation is the modus operandi of 
democracy, LWLVLWVRSHUDWLYHSULQFLSOHDQGWKHUHIRUHWRSURWHVWGHPRFUDF\¶V
fallibility (and endorse instead the security of expert rule, be it based on 
popular consent) means rejecting democracy altogether. This experimental 
character of democracy issues the right to politics ± the right that binding 
political rules be designed in a dynamic process of uncertain, open-ended 
bricolage, rather than expert political engineering.  
 
 
b) democracy as self-authorship  
The second element in the constitutive story of democracy is an account of 
self-rule not as a matter of correct representation of the collective self, but as 
active authorship of societal rules. In order to engage the right to politics in an 
open-ended experimentation, it would not do to invoke democracy as 
representation of the popular will, as per the original republican vision ± as 
this would negate the very nature of open-ended, a-teleological, 
experimentation. Neither would it suffice, however, to equate self-rule with 
autonomy, as per the intuitions of philosophical liberalism. We are currently 
held hostage by the notion of political autonomy, of independence as self-
sufficiency.  In the neoliberal condition, self-reliance (individual 
responsibilization) has become a WRRORIGRPLQDWLRQ³*HWSHRSOHRIIRf 
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dependency and on to lives of self-VXIILFLHQF\´LVWKHW\SLFDOFDOORIQHROLEHUDO
hegemony, urged in the name of democracy .The freedom given to citizens in 
the formula of democracy as individual self-reliance amounts to granting them 
the freedom of blaming themselves for their failures.  
If liberal notions of self-rule as individual self-sufficiency and the old 
republican visions of a cohesive community governing itself through proper 
representation would not do, what alternative is there at hand?  We need to 
undertake, as Seyla Benhabib has suggested in this forum, D³UH-translation of 
UHSXEOLFDQLVP´DZD\IURPWKHVHFDWHJRULHVDQG,ZLOOnow proceed to table a 
proposal on the form of retranslation we need. Such an alternative emerges 
not within the solutions offered within republicanism and liberalism as 
philosophical traditions, but in their very dispute about the notion of autonomy 
best befitting democracy. Republicans from Rousseau to Tocqueville and 
Jefferson (but also Dostoyevsky --a liberal socialist) have pointed out that 
although liberal autonomy (that is, freedom as non-interference) might be a 
worthy value, it does not put us in charge of ourselves -- it does not allow us 
to think the larger conditions of our collective existence, to question and re-
craft the framework within which personal autonomy is granted.17 In this 
sense choice and individual freedom are perfectly compatible with domination. 
As we know, the standard answer republicanism offers ± of representing the 
general will of the community rather than the particular and partial preferences 
of its individual members contains the risk of sacrificing the individual to the 
community, of forcing pluralism into uniformity, of instigating intolerance to 
difference and dissent. However, the two positions find a mutual 
accommodation once the principle of non-domination as non-interference is 
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µWUDQVODWHG¶LQWRa principle of non-domination that refers to the capacity to 
control the powers that shape our collective existence (the powers of the 
globally integrated markets in the case at hand), free of the original republican 
proviso of representation of a purported collective will. Within such a 
retranslation, conflicts within the pluralism of interests acquire value as a 
catalyst of the disclosure of the structural sources of domination ± a point to 
which I will return later.18 It is in this sense that a redesigned republican notion 
of non-domination implies a right to politics ± politics as contestation of the 
very framework of our collective existence, thus submitting democratic 
experimentation to the goals of non-domination.   
 
c) democratic agency  
And here I come to the third constitutive element of democracy that 
contains as its logical presupposition the right to politics ± namely the 
particular notion of agency that democracy as self-rule implies. In unfolding 
this part of the argument, I will take my cue from the defense of a 
³IXQGDPHQWDOKXPDQULJKWWRGHPRFUDF\´ Seyla Benhabib has advanced. 
Benhabib proceeds from a discourse-theoretic account of human rights 
ZLWKLQZKLFKWKHVXEMHFWVRIULJKWVDUHQRWMXVW³ULJKWV-bearing´ but also 
³reason-JLYLQJ´: (1) the rights-bearing person is an agent with a capacity for 
communicative freedom and (2) citizens address validity claims to one 
another in recognition of a common and equal capacity for communicative 
freedom.19  The very practice of claims-articulation addressed to others 
presupposes an active agent who recognizes and honors the active agency of 
others. Thus, a fundamental right to democracy emerges on grounds that, as 
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Benhabib puts it ³DUREXVWULJKWWRVHOI-government is essential for being able 
to make justifiable claims concerning the valid range of variation in the 
DUWLFXODWLRQRIKXPDQULJKWVDWDOO´20 The capacity to formulate goals of action 
and justify them with reasons to others that Benhabib makes central in her 
ontology of the rights-bearing person allows us to valorize properly the active 
agency demanded for a viable conception of democracy as experimental self-
authorship. 
In other words, notions of moral autonomy and mutual respect that are 
commonly taken to underpin the idea of equal rights, are insufficient to 
engender democracy as the political incarnation of (collectively exercised) 
moral autonomy. Equality of citizenship (as the political expression of equal 
moral autonomy) is a necessary but insufficient condition for democracy as 
self-rule.  We need to link the dynamic side of democratic experimentation to 
the notion of political equality in order to account for the political agency of a 
self-legislating people. If, as Charles Taylor has argued, for a viable 
conception of human rights we need to FRQFHLYHRISHRSOHDV³Dctive 
cooperators in establishing and ensuring the respect which is due them,´21 
then for a viable conception of democracy we need to conceive of people as 
active cooperators in challenging, establishing and ensuring the rules of social 
co-existence that bind them. This implies that we see others as right-
deserving and rights-pursuing active agents ±not subjects who profit from a 
fair social order, but authors of the social order to which they are subjected. 
Without recognizing the inherent value of conflict and contestation in the 
process of democratic policy-making, and the value of FLWL]HQV¶HQJDJLQJLQ
conflict (within which consensus might emerge), values such as equality of 
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citizenship and shared prosperity and security become products of political 
consumerism, best achieved via granting popular mandate to policy experts. 
In the formula adumbrated here, democracy stands as an enterprise of 
communicative articulation of (often radical) conflicts of interests and values ± 
as such, it presupposes that (1) participants are awarded equal agency; (2) 
they justify to each other their conflicting pursuits as being merit-worthy (3) all 
enact that agency of self-rule ± it cannot be delegated, outsourced to experts 
or professional politicians in the name of assumed public interest. The right to 
politics is implied in this essential communicative freedom, as the proper 
political application of this freedom is to engage in the contestation of existing 
rules of social cooperatiRQLQYLHZRIDFWRUV¶SDUWLFXODUFLUFXPVWDQFHV and 
perceptions of personal and collective interests.  
It is in this sense that the right to politics actuates the right to 
GHPRFUDF\LQWKHVDPHZD\WKDWZKDW$UHQGWQDPHG³WKHULJKWWRKDYHULJKWV´
actuates human rights. 7KHVHµPHWDULJKWV¶DQGLQWKLVFDWHJRU\,LQFOXGHZKDW
5HLQHU)RUVWKDVFRQFHSWXDOL]HGDVµWKHULJKWWRMXVWLILFDWLRQ¶DUH
simultaneously inherent in other concepts of rights as their logical 
presuppositions and as empirical conditions enabling the practice of rights.22 
  
 
The trouble with politicization: on relational versus systemic domination  
 
It is time to return to the original concern driving this analysis. As I argued, our 
IUXVWUDWLRQVZLWKGHPRFUDF\¶VLPSRWHQFHDQGZLWKWKHGHPLVHRIWKHSROLWLFDO
express the intuition that widely shared social maladies are not being 
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transmitted into the political sphere as a valid object of policy-making. Where 
GRHVWKHµWUDQVPLVVLRQPHFKDQLVP¶EUHDNGRZQ" 
To elucidate this point, I will return to the issue of democratic self-
authorship as non-domination and develop it further by distinguishing two 
types of unfreedom which I will name relational and systemic domination.23 I 
will claim that, to exercise self-authorship, a political community needs to be 
able to challenge the societal order with regard to both these trajectories of 
domination; currently, however, no political dynamics take place along the 
systemic one. Let me explain.  
Relational domination concerns the unequal distribution of resources 
among actors, leading to some human beings dominating others. The 
resources in question might be economic, cultural, and political; material and 
ideational. Injustice, from this perspective, stands in terms of power 
asymmetries; the appropriate remedy is to equalize power relations via the 
redistribution of resources.  Here liberalism and republicanism are in 
agreement: liberalism advances the value of equal freedom; republicanism -- 
freedom in equality.  
Yet, the republican unease with the limited emancipatory potential of 
liberal autonomy (which I discussed earlier) points to a second dimension of 
domination ± namely, domination stemming from the larger framework within 
which autonomy, equality and inclusion are being sought. We need to ask: 
equality in what, within what form of life? This in turn prompts us to target the 
forces that shape this framework ± that is, the mechanisms of social 
reproduction, including the logics of valorization and the logistics of allocation 
of life-chances. This is the remit of systemic domination: it concerns the very 
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model of wellbeing within which power is distributed among actors. Here 
injustice has to do with the production of a generalized social harm beyond 
the unequal distribution of social advantage and disadvantage; justice would 
therefore target not the unequal distribution of social status, but the 
constitution of social status itself; not how valued goods (wealth, power, 
identity recognition) are distributed, but what is being distributed and how it is 
generated. Often the realm of relational domination is the arena where victims 
fight other victims (men versus women, rich versus poor), while the 
perpetrator (in the case at hand ± globally integrated capitalism and the ruling 
elites which make sure it is unbridled) runs free. For instance, feminist 
VWUXJJOHVIRUZRPHQ¶Vparity with men in the labor market have proven to be a 
pyric victory, as they did not target the nature of the socio-economic model 
within which women aspired to parity; they thus overlooked the systemic 
domination of ever increasing commodification pressures endemic to globally 
integrated capitalism ± harm suffered by men as well.  In a word, when 
focusing on systemic domination, critique and political mobilization are to 
target the structural sources of social injustice, the very constitutive logic of 
the system of social relations. 
Neoliberal capitalism is effectively hijacking the emancipatory agenda 
of public protest because this agenda is too narrowly framed in the terms of 
power asymmetries ± notice how everything nowadays is about inequality and 
exclusion (³7D[WKHULFK´³The system is against us but we are not against it´ 
± that is, we want a more equal and inclusive system). Systemic forms of 
injustice (employment insecurity, increased workload) are misframed into 
relational ones (wealth inequality, exclusion). Tellingly, wealth inequality has 
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become a concern shared across ideological and class boundaries.24 Thus, 
instead of the discussion we urgently need of the massive economic 
precariousness that global economic competition entails, we are limiting these 
debates to redistribution. Surely, even if we were all to become economically 
equal and perfectly included in the machinery of global wealth creation, this 
will hardly diminish the abuse of human beings, societies and nature as they 
submit to the productivist imperatives of global capitalism. We need both 
types of struggle, as well as attention to how they impact each other.   
There is now considerable public debate and intensive social protest, 
but it is exactly within this democratic debate that legitimate social concerns 
get politicized in a way that makes them compatible with the TINA policy logic.  
Thus, purported solutions to joblessness and to the inflow of immigrants in 
Europe is to keep immigrants out, further reduce job security while increasing 
taxation ± in hopes that this will make µRXU¶FRPSDQLHVPRUHFRPSHWLWLYHDQG
eventually spur recruitment.25 Symptomatic of this is the complete 
disappearance of calls to µDOWHU-PRQGLDOLVDWLRQ¶IRUDVRFLDlist globalization), 
while we are busy debating the distribution of life chances within our societies 
(who gets in and what they get), while what is being distributed is already 
decided by the imperatives of global economic competition. In other words, 
the problem with the TINA policy logic is not that it precludes public debate 
and thus stifles both democracy and politics, but that it disables the 
politicization of social injustice generated by the political economy ± disables 
the translation of this injustice into viable policy alternatives that question the 
political commitment to competitiveness in the global economy. Instead, these 
forms of injustice are encoded as belonging to the sphere of relational 
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injustice and politicized as matters of fair distribution of material and symbolic 
resources.  
 
Conclusion: There Is No Alternative 
 
,HQGHDYRUHGWRGLVFHUQ³DULJKWWRSROLWLFV´LQWKHYHU\constitutive fabric 
of democracy ± in its GNA.  My effort was prompted not by a desire to add yet 
another right to the compendium of rights, but to direct attention to the issue 
of politicization ± the need for radical conflict among competing policy 
alternatives± conflict that enables us to question, and possibly affect, the 
parameters of our collective existence. The sickness that has recently afflicted 
democracy consists in narrowing the space of conflict to matters of distribution 
of valuables ZKDW,GLVFXVVHGDVµUHODWLRQDOGRPLQDWLRQ¶; with this, radical 
conflict ± conflict regarding the nature of the political economy ± is evacuated 
from the realm of the political. These matters are left instead to the 
economistic logic and expert managerial logistics of TINA. It is in this sense 
that TINA has violated the right to politics± by hampering our capacity to 
question systemic domination, to strike at the structural sources of social 
injustice.  
 Thus left unquestioned, the policy commitment to competitiveness in the 
global economy has intensified economic insecurity -- not least via the policies 
of individual responsibilization and precarious employment that are being 
implemented even when economies are growing. This generalized insecurity 
has brought to a halt the experimental dynamics of democracy. Social protest 
from its ugliest forms (xenophobia) ± to its most noble ones (the young jobless 
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Spanish Indignados) ± express a fear of loss of basic livelihood. Both at the 
voting booth and in street protests, we have witnessed massive mobilizations 
of fear. This is democracy on the defensive, not having the guts to experiment 
with alternatives, to break free of its reliance on experts in global economic 
competition. It is thus that democracy has degenerated from creative 
experimentation to an anxious search for certainty, re-opening the road to 
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